Are games really ‘surpassed’?
Recently
I was browsing BGG for several reasons and my eye was caught by the comments of
someone on an old Strategy&Tactics game, Central Command. The poster (the
usual representative of the low forms of human life that write on that
website…) claimed that: ‘Not a bad effort, but surpassed by 3W's Light
Division.’ Oh well, it is not something new, a lot of people comment that game
A is surpassed by game B. but it is really the case or we are prisoners of a
sort of cult of the new? I own both games and that prompted me to bring Central
Command back on the games’ table.
Central Command: Duelling for the strait of Hormuz
If
you are thinking about invading Iran to protect the flow of Oil to the west
this is a game you can be interested in, yet this is not the game you expect.
Make no mistake ladies and gentlemen, this is a game published in 1984 when the
cold war was still raging and the bad guys spoke Russians and drove T-72s,
BMPs, and T-62s, ok maybe these things
have not changed… anyway Central Command:
Superpower Confrontation in the Straits of Hormuz is a 1984 game
published by Strategy and Tactics, at the time under the aegis of TSR and
designed by the renowned modern warfare designer Charles T. Kamps. It is an old game, but, nevertheless it
contains some very interesting concepts that are worth to explore even today.
The map |
The rather nice counters |
The
setting of Central Command is clearly the cold war. In the three scenarios
provided the soviets are invading Iran and trying to close the Persian Gulf to
western shipping. The US Central Command has to stop them. The game is very
conventionally looking. You got one standard hex map a sheet of NATO style
counters, charts, table, everything else you need. The map cover the northern (Iranian side) of the strait of Hormuz, with the city
of Bandar Abbas, its airfields and ports, and the surrounding areas. The rules
are quite short just a few pages. They are reasonably clear, but, alas, there
are some minor points of contention. The game itself is based on the system
previously published in a well received game covering a hypothetical Soviet
assault on northern Norway, Nordkapp (oh well, I own it, I need to review it too soon!).
The package will not have the cultists of the new rejoicing, but it is
pleasant to the eye. I like the map and the air units, the latter graced by
little and well done icon representing the aircrafts.
The
sequence of play is quite conventional in its appearance. It is a Igo-yugo
(Initiative Player- Reactive Player) sequence at its heart where every unit can
move. There are no command rules restricting your movements. There is some sort or reaction involved with
air and helicopter units but the sequence of play is rigid. Anyway the sequence
is standard.
- · You decide the mode of your units
- · You enter your reinforcements
- · The opponent has is offensive air phase and you can intercept
- · Supply is adjudicated
- · You move you units
- · You do your combat support air operations and the enemy reacts intercepting your units and providing his own close air support
- · The US decides if and where to deploy his battleship unit
- · Your helicopters move and enemy helicopter reacts
- · Combat
Tuna Boats! |
As
you see the sequence is quite conventional but there are indeed some twists.
The first thing that is worth to mention is unit modes. The unit in the game
are backprinted, but instead of having two steps you have two modes. Infantry
units can be in their mobile mode or entrenched. Entrenched units trade their
movement allowance for an increase in defence factors. Even if entrenched they
can attack, but they will have to switch in mobile mode if they advance after
combat (quite reasonable). Mechanized units have also two modes, combat and
high speed. In high speed mode the unit move faster, but its combat capability
is reduced. Also worth to mention is the
fact that, even if the units are mainly battalions (US and some Soviets),
regiments (the bulk of the soviets), and a smattering of platoons and
companies, there are transport units and carried units. This is quite unusual
for a game at this scale (24 hours’ turns, decidedly operational in map and
unit scale). It is unusual to see a
Soviet Motor Rifle Regiment represented by its infantry component and its BMPs
ot BTRs transports in different counters, but Central Command does this. As much as it is unusual the thing provides
some sound benefits. The first benefits is in the treatment of US Marine units.
You have a limited amount of Amphibious Tractor Companies (the Tuna Boats… the
LTVP7) that can be allocated to Marine battalions to mechanize them. It
reflects standard procedure seen in Desert Storm and even in Iraqi Freedom. It
allows you to use the Bronegruppa tactics developed in Afghanistan by the
Soviet Army where the mechanized vehicles were used as flanking and enveloping
elements in local attacks. It also allows you to leave your mechanized
transport when you do not need them. When the infantry is transported the two
units counts as one, when the infantry leaves the tracks or wheel you have two
independent units. You can combine and recombine the units without
restrictions.
This
lead us to another main point, movement. As much movement is conventional in
its outlook the movement costs table forces you to take some hard decisions.
You have to different costs one for the Dry and another for the Wet season. You decide the season by die roll
at the start of the scenario. Well during the Wet season vehicular movement is a
nightmare outside the road network. Several areas are the same during the dry
seasons. Even if your tracked vehicles usually can negotiate bad terrain
reasonably well, the wheeled vehicles (trucks towing guns, BTRs, LAV, Jeeps and
Hummers) are almost useless outside the roads. The personnel/carrier idea
allows to represent this in a simple but effective manner, often you will
realize that marching is better than riding in areas without road networks.
That remind me of an old interwar article by a certain George C. Patton while
he was pointing that mechanized warfare is much better in areas where it can
exploit an extensive road network.
Yet
the infantry is not as powerful as these lines could suggest. Infantry units
are soft units, mechanized units are hard. In combat in the open hard units are
advantaged by the use of column shifts. This means that even if the infantry
can move quickly even on open ground, mechanized formations still have some
advantages in combat. One of these is the ability of hard units to overrun soft
units in the open. Differently from the current standards overruns simply allow
the moving unit to run over the defender
and appear at the back. Yet having locking zone of control that inhibit
retreats this simple tactic guarantee to block the retreat path of the enemy.
The combat result table is what you expect from a 1984 game. Retreats,
eliminations, exchanges. Here the dreaded exchange results is somewhat
mitigated by the ability of losing carrier or personnel units, the fact that it
is not overly common, and that you have a decent number of units. There are no
step losses or disruption. The combat is less bloody than today games, but the
use of overrun and helicopters made encirclement easy if you really want to do.
Helicopters
are an interesting take. They are represented in company or battalion strength,
you have transport and attack helos.
Transport helicopters are further divided in light, medium, and heavy.
You have also the hybrid attack/transport soviet models (Hind A and Hip)
represented by transport units with high combat values. I know the Hind A (Mil
Mi 24A) and the Hip (Mil Mi 8) are not really attack helicopter like the Cobra
or the Apache, but their mission was to
transport the attack units and provide immediate fire support (as they graphically do in the movie ‘The 9th
Company’).
From the 9th Rota, but it could be Hormuz |
Charles Kamps decision to model them as transport helos with combat
capability is thus eminently reasonable.
We are talking of helicopters how they work in the game? First you have
two mode, standard and reaction. In reaction mode they move in the enemy half
of the turn. They can also move transported units with them. This means that
reactive helicopters can both reinforce a combat or withdraw from it. Helicopter units exert ZOC and thus they can
block retreat. They have a big radius and they do not pay movement costs,
finally they can move between ZOC even if they can be subject to air defence
fire. They are quite powerful, the big
drawback is that they can suffer losses in an Exchange result and, quite
puzzling at first, that ground units can attack them. This last bit is probably
the most unrealistic part of the helicopter treatment. Instead of having two
elements, the ground ‘base’ and the helicopters themselves the game joined them
in a single counter. As usual in design you have trade off, in this case you
save counters and rules, but you have to accept a loss in accuracy. If you take
the helicopter operations to the letter it is as every time you move them also
their entire ground support echelon leave the airfield and deploys. In my repeated plays in the years I realized
that this is not the big problem you think. History as demonstrated that
helicopter units are indeed fragile. The machines themselves suffers quite a
lot of attrition both by enemy action
and simply flying operations. sometime after intensive short period of
operations whole units need to stood down. The net effect of the helicopter
rules does just that. It has also the added benefit to force them to commit
helicopter to specific areas rather than having the same assets performing at
unrealistic tempo. Flexibility is well reproduced by having soviet units in
battalion size and US attack helicopters in company size.
The
last area that I want to comment upon is the air system. Taken at face value is
quite puzzling. The US player can commit two units per mission, the soviet
player three. When opposing enemy air
units occupy the same hex you have air to air combat. You sum the air combat
factors, roll a d6 per side and compare the two totals (factors + roll). Higher
total wins. The winner then rolls two dice per air unit losing it on a 12, the
loser do the same but loses units on 2 and 12. The loss on a 12 is also used
for antiaircraft fire. If you are doing CAS your CAS value is added to your
units, if it is a ground strike you sum the interdiction factors of the
attacking planes and use them to do a conventional odd based attack on the
ground units (but only DE, defender eliminated, results are used), and if you
are doing interdiction you double the interdiction value and that number of
enemy combat factors will not be able to trace supply through the hex. At first
the air combat system was driving me crazy. It looked silly. But it is not
silly as it appears. Every unit is a whole squadron. Squadrons does not disappear
in 24 hours, at least not now and not if they are based outside the battle
areas. What the system gives you is a
slow attritional approach that sooner or later will tell you that the squadron
is not more combat capable. Losing air battles means you double your chances of
losses. There is also a nice touch. Soviet units are weaker, but stack three
per hex instead of two. This means that they will have (assuming maximum
stacking) more chances to suffer casualties.
Central
Command came with three scenarios. The introductory one depicts an US delaying
Action in defence of supply lines after the initial assault have played off.
The two others are variations of the same theme. Moscow has decided to close
the straits and the US Central Command has to prevent this. The first variation
has some Iranian garrison on the map and the two player staging (in random
initiative order) an airborne drop to seize a beachhead and then reinforcing
it. The second variation postulates a Soviet successful coup (shadows of Kabul)
in Iran and allow them to already deploy on the map and defend against the US
reaction. The latter variation favour the soviet Player. His reinforcements are
coming faster and he starts the game with the a full airborne division
(mechanized, Soviet style) already deployed.
I
hope this has explained my take on the system. I think that, despite 30 years
of age it was sound and is still worth to play. But how it stacks against
history? Well, there is no history, because we are simulating a counterfactual even,
but there are realities we know. The
whole premise of the game now sounds farfetched but in 1984 was real. A whole
theatre command had been created to respond to such an eventuality. As much
some pundits, including some of my department’s professor could have argued
conventional war was not possible the scenario was not as farfetched as… Russia
annexing Crimea? I think that in this
respect the game is also sound. But how Central Command represents the
realities of the day? Well here we have some problems, but also some really
good gems. I will start from the strengths of the game. The US OoB is accurate,
it also show a period in the US Armed Forces history when projection
capabilities were minimal. In Central Command the 1st Marine
Division is very slow to deploy. The amphibious capability is incredibly slow
to appear (you can deploy a single Amphibious Brigade only after 15 days), and
the bulk of the division is coming through Maritime Prepositioned Equipment and
air transport. This means that your most powerful asset is also the weakest
link of your deployment chain. The two
light divisions are again well portrayed. You can slowly drop the 82nd
(again no chance of a divisional drop) but the division is more or less pure
infantry. The 101st is better, but is also slow to deploy. 1984 was
before the quick rise in fast deployment capabilities. As side note the
situation is quite similar to the current one. US capabilities are well
modelled.
The
real weakness of Central Command is in its modeling of the soviet
capabilities. While the ground forces and helicopters feel right, the air units
are quite surprising. Mig 29 and Su 27 are represented as good ground attack
planes. The Mig 27 is a good multi-role aircraft. Well you can say what you
want, but in 1984 Mig 29 and Su 27 were more or less drawings in the Military
Power review. We did not know a lot on them and Charles Kamps speculated. The
Mig 27 was a bit overrated (we did not realize that the duck nose housed only a
laser designator and a telemeter and not a full air intercept radar). In that
regard Central Command is not accurate.
But this is just a small weakness. It is the problem when you tackle
contemporary subject drawing from incomplete sources. In the end you end up
making a fool of yourself. Are these inaccuracies detrimental to the game?
I
would say no. The planes were still marginal players in the Soviet arsenal and
the overall impact of air force operations is still here. Furthermore Central
Command gave us insight not only on the situation itself, but also on the
way the US perceived the potential
threat in 1984. It also provides some useful observation on the limit of
combined operations when your power projection capability is more or less marginal.
Yes, the Central Command was able to quickly put limited units on the ground
across the globe, but once landed they were vulnerable to an enemy that was
maybe weaker and less technologically advanced, but closer to its supply bases.
The game does also a wonderful job to portray the main weakness of modern
mechanized warfare, namely its
dependence on the road network. In Central Command you are road bound. Even
worse you depend on a limited number of road choke points to keep your forces
supplied. The detailed interdiction system forces you to consider not only the
overall effects of supplies, but how to organize your supply lines on the
ground. Having your spearhead not
depending on single choke points allows you to limit the effectiveness of enemy
air interdiction. Yet the area is channeling you along few roads. The dilemma
the soviet player faces is interesting.
Usually the Soviets are more road bound and, if the Americans can get
rid of the soviet paratroopers quickly, are attacking. They need to move
quickly along major roads, but they are also in need to avoid being strangled
by interdiction.