At
this point the usual reviewer on BGG (yes I hate that place!) will start to
ramble about balance, fun, cards, and perfect strategies. I reckon people are
happy with this, but not me. I derive my entertainment, my fun, from how much
plausible decision making I am experiencing while playing. I am not enthralled
by clever mechanics if they force me to distance myself from reality (yes I
consider Combat Commander rubbish and over-clever!). As I boasted earlier I think I am also
qualified to tell the people that ramble about the impossibility to have
simulations that they can shut their mouths and look up simulation in a
dictionary. What concerns me if is, despite lavish components, and a working
set of mechanics Andean Abyss is
telling me something about the real conflict in Colombia. I am not talking of
sweat and blood here, this is a simulation not reality, I am talking about
decision making. Even if the game is entertaining I am here to evaluate how it addresses the problem of COIN operations.
Allow me to start this rambling stating that at the moment we have only a very
nebulous idea of what counterinsurgency is. More or less because we have
grouped so many things under this label that it has lost any real significance.
We have problems in the real world just to define insurgency. I do not believe
that there is a general COIN model. Some people like John Nagl think it exists,
but the same people are also prone to misquote their sources to buttress their
claims and to ignore evidence to hide their fallings. They have been labelled
COINistas in several circles. Furthermore they claim that not only there is a general
COIN model but also a perfect solution to COIN (yes the perfect plan!). From a
Historian perspective there are insurgencies and counter-insurgency campaigns
but you cannot have an insurgency model, this is a thing better left to the
average rambling social scientist and the lesser minds doing International
Relations Theory (at least some of my colleagues in my old department fit that description;
this is criticism levelled against some specific individuals and their
ramblings about using models to explain everything ignoring capabilities). I
think this approach is basically faulty, overambitious, and frail with dangers.
Yet from an historical standpoint Colombia is an insurgency and also a pretty
nasty one. While I cannto create a checklist for insurgencies around the world
I can smell a clear one when I bump into it. In Colombia there were at least
two factions (FARC and the loosely organize Cartel) that wanted to replace the
government or force it to concession. There was not a lot of high intensity
warfare because, despite successes and reasonable external support, the FARC
never developed a conventional capability to really take the military head on.
It was no Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq here the FARC never had a chance
to drive their tank columns in the streets of Bogota, thus they had to collapse
the government by other means.
A
corollary to this is that there is no insurgency warfare (and by extension COIN
warfare) as a distinct kind of war. There are historical campaigns that could
be simulated to provide insights. From a
wargamer stand point this mean that I will not address how the COIN series
succeed in portray a generic counterinsurgency model, but rather on how it
portrays Colombia. At the moment of this
writing I know three other games using the same system are around, but I will
not comment on them now. Here I am in the business to compare Andean Abyss to the reality of
Colombia.
Said
that this I will put the cart in front of my oxen and flatly state that Andean Abyss does a good job to portray Colombia from an historian
perspective. It presents the players with
historically appropriate tradeoffs. It does not hurt in that regards that I
tend to subscribe with the majority of Volko’s decisions. From a Historian perspective civil wars are
not just an ideological conflict between models from the left and the right,
the rambling of ideologically dominated scholars notwithstanding. Even more
importantly civil wars are usually not just a two player game with factions
neatly arranged in blue and red team.
Even with their complexity and purported analytical backgrounds
professional games tend to fall in this category with clearly defined Red and
Blue teams (something with spurious green teams in the middle). As I mentioned
in part I Andean Abyss has four
factions with different goals and methods. It is certainly a simplification (I
am pretty sdure the Cartle was much more than a single faction, and you can
defined the AUC as a loose confederation), but it is important because it shows
the multi-headed nature of the war in Colombia while still keeping the model reasonably
approachable.
While
alliances and common goals are included in the game it is also clear that there
will be only one winner (but I am not willing to imagine how a Cartel’s ruled
Colombia would have ended… ok it is easy, weak central government in the pocket
of the Narcos… but then would have they stopped? Well I end my chilly digression).
The game also take a middle ground between the two competing approach to
insurgency, the military and civil approach. It is a war. Even if you are in
the business of promoting your ideology and your view of Colombia’s future, you
are at war and you have to conduct direct operations. You have to kill the bad
guys. Now a little digression… the real
advantage of the four faction approach is that your definition of good and bad
guys could change during the game. There are time when alliances, truces, and
deals are necessary. Even in the single player version where you are the
Government you reazlie that at time you need to grant one of your opponents a
bit of breathing space because you need to focus on someone else. It is not just killing bad guys, you have to
dedicate considerable resources to this task.
Certain
writers seems to believe that if you make the people happy they will simply turn to your side and the
opposition will disappear. Then they tell you how you can make people happy.
Well in Andean Abyss there are
advantage in having people supporting you, yet this support is flickering and
often take just a couple of guys (cubes) firing Kalashnikovs for it to disappear.
Combat operations and civic action are interlinked. You cannot just push one,
to a certain extent if you do not kill the bad guys your effort is wasted. I
know that this is not politically correct, but violence is critical for
success. After all if violence was not an option the situation would not have
warranted the title of Andean Abyss.
A successful player has to have a monopoly on
violence, this means not only the ability to use it, but to prevent the
opponents to use it. As much this sounds simple this is the great nightmare of
the game. Violence is cheap, and produces several rewards, especially for the
irregular players. Yet the more violence you employ the less control you have
on the long term outcome. If the FARC just behave like bloodthirsty butchers
the government will collapse, but the AUC will take benefits and expand. The AUC
is probably even less happy with you than the Colombian Government is. Also the
more people apply violence to the same area the more chaotic results are
produced. So you not only need to apply reasonable violence you need to be able
to control the amount of violence that the other factions use.
If
you want to have this kind of monopoly
you need to remove the bad guys from the area. Again we return to the critical
dilemma, how you remove them? Killing them of course, yet to kill them you use
violence and resources. The resources you use in combat operations (Assault and
Attack) are not available for other actions. These resources are the aptly
named resource points (money, supplies,
everything) and your forces (the dreaded cubes and octagons). Both are finite
and your forces are also limited by the basic law of physics, they cannot be in
two places at once. This force oyu to
look at geography, both natural and humans. You need to prioritize your gains
in area that are important to you. Yet, you also need to prevent your opponents
to do the same in areas that are critical to them. As the government player,
for example, you really want to keep cities and prosperous area under your firm
control. Yet if you let the cartel run amok in the coca producing areas they
will simply become filthy rich and powerful and your half friends in Washington
will be mightily pissed off and with reasons.
Well I was saying something about not putting resources where the enemy is strong? I got rewarded with FARC and Cartel unchecked growth! |
Moving
from general principles to ‘details’ Andean
Abyss is not falling apart. The way local capabilities are represented is
also effective. The Colombian army is not this powerful instrument. It is small;
it has not a lot of force multipliers, especially at start. If you want to
confront the FARC head to head you have to realize this before you start to
send your guys against their strongholds. I could now start a tirade on why it
is important to engage even an unconventional enemy on your terms and why in
the end Westmoreland was doing the right thing in Vietnam, but I will wait
until Volko decides to be generous again with Fire in the Lake… (hint
hint). But this is not Vietnam, this is
Colombia and even if you have a sound COIN approach you have to tailor to your
actual capabilities. While the regular army has some they are not a top level
force in terms of equipment. The game
accurately tell this to you even if you do not have counters representing
choppers, air power, or mechanized forces.
As much I dislike abstractions in Andean
Abyss the extremely abstracted level used to represent force elements (oh
my God, I am talking as the chaps at DSTL) is warranted. Still, and this is an impressive feat in my
little book, the game manages to track improvement (or collapse) of combat
capabilities. In the real world the Colombian Army experienced and impressive
transformation and you can see it in the game… if you are lucky. These transformations are not pre-ordained. They
take good people and a bit of luck (and powerful and smart friends supplying
you the right kit at the right time). In the game the improvement of the
Colombian Army are driven by cards. Sometime you are particularly unlucky and
these cards are the ones you removed from the deck when you generate it before
the game.
This
brings us to another critical element: Lady Luck. I think this is a key aspect.
There must be an important element of randomness. Despite is almost completely
diceless combat Andean Abyss requires, especially if you are the Government or
playing solo as the government, an abundant dose of luck. This is because the strength
of the government depends on capabilities that are largely provided by the
United States, or by internal reform initiated by local elements. The fact that some cards are indeed removed
from the deck during game preparation is critical. If you are unlucky you will
lose your key force enabler (happened in my first solo game) and your hopes
will suffer a severe blow. Is this a
gamey approach or is a sound simulation decision? Well, some people, including
the analysts working for the Ministry of Defence here in UK or some chaps in
the British Army do not like luck or randomness. I have been told countless
time that in analytical simulation randomness has no place. Outcomes have to be
predictable. You cannot tell the general that his operation failed because he
threw bad dice… except if the General in question is Major General Andrew
Sharpe OBE and he understands what this means. Ooh well, I am quite sure
Captain Aoki, Imperial Japanese Navy, would be delighted to knew that a single
lucky 1,000 pounder bomb could never have hit the Akagi, especially if his ship
had been attacked by only three dive bombers and only one bomb hit her. If you
do not have randomness and luck you have predictable results, practically you
can read the future and you are providing decision makers with working crystal
ball. To be brutally honest I think that refusing randomness and luck is a product
of flawed logic and the obsession with the ‘Blue will always win’
approach.
In
the specific case of Andean Abyss
these events represent decision and commitments that are outside the ability of
the players to predict. Do we know for certain that Colombian officers would
have been able to adapt their tactics and force structure to successfully
defeat FARC forces in the field? I think no.
The randomness in the game important both from an analytical and a
teaching (read historical) point of view. It allow the game narrative to develop in
different way and, even more importantly from the historical point of view,
allow you to discuss the relative importance of different factors and event.
The more plays you have the more insight you get on the relative importance of
specific events and strategies. Yes, an history book or a report can give you
the same, but you can discuss it and try the logic of Volko’s research better that simply reading a dry text were a
sequence of causes and effects is just [provided to you. I am firmly convince that conflict simulations,
especially good ones like Andean Abyss
are better suited to generate understanding and discussion on dynamics than
books or lectures and I am saying this with several years experience of teaching,
sometime also using games in the classroom. I will not be shy and said that if
I have to teach COIN I will definitely use Andean
Abyss to explain Colombia and COIN campaign
in similar situations. The underlining model is solid, and they way the narrative
develops it is reasonable.
Where
the game is not satisfying me is in its general representation of operations.
Beside the distinction between troops and police on one side and military
forces for the government and guerrilla in general there is no attempt to differentiate combat capabilities. There
is also no way for the FARC to build a conventional military capability. They
will stay guerrilla for the whole game and the government will always have a
military advantage (predictable combat) over them. Specific military
capabilities are shown by cards and event rather than being explicitly
portrayed by o map game elements. I think that this is wrong, not just wrong in
general (insurgencies tend over time to acquire conventional capabilities), but
also for Colombia where the FARC attempted some effort to field a sort of
conventional force, not very successful mind you, but they attempted to at
least hold on their ‘liberated areas’. Yet in this particular scenario it is
not a deal breaking mistake. My other
gripe is on combat. It is too predictable; you know that you will have an exact
return for the resources you invest. While
it is a good way to model technical superiority but it lacks the potential to
show the really bad results that could be produced by poorly executed
operations. Its counterpoint is that so much randomness is introduced in other
elements and this randomness indeed tends to favour the unconventional factions
that probably the net effect is the same. Still I would have preferred to have
a game deck less stacked against the Colombian government on one side and the
potential for severe disasters in military operations on the other. I think
that on the military side Joe Miranda’s system in Target: Iraq is more to my liking.
Wrapping
up this long discussion I would say that Andean Abyss is indeed capable to
produce a believable narrative and believable mechanics to support its subject.
As the FARC player you can follow historical tactics and be rewarded with
logical outcomes. As the government player you have in broad terms the same tools at your disposal
that the people in Bogota had at the time. You are also prisoner of outside actors and
factors over which you have limited or no control.
No
wargame is perfect. Wargames are like weapons systems, they are a compromise
between various need. Still some compromises works much better than others
(like the F4 Phantom was awesome, and the F-111B was awful). Said that I think Andean Abyss does a better job in
replicating is slice of reality than several other systems, commercial or
professional, I have seen. I think that is much better than the professional
stuff I have seen or worked with for a lot of reasons. First of all the fact
that the action is more open. There are some assumptions about right and wrong
approaches, but a lot is left to a real open action-reaction cycle. You have
the freedom to experiment with different approaches and to get different
results. It also teach you that a given approach is not ensuring you a perfect
result, war is indeed a two side play and there is a competing
conductor/director trying to make his version of the script dominant. Andean Abyss also lacks the obnoxious
subject matter expert so prevalent in professional games that introduces arbitrary
events often just to force a script in the narrative. Yes, the event on the
cards are arbitrary, but… they are based on historical event that happened and
they are independent from exercise controllers who seems to favour a specific
side. The events are also explained and the designer gives you reasons for them
(thanks Volko!). Furthermore the fact that each event could be usually
exploited by both sides depending on the player order and previous action allows
you a certain leverage in ability to plan. More to the point they are random.
It is not Mr X (no name involved) telling you this is happening because he has
his own script. You pick the card and something happens that may be good or
bad.
Considering
abstractions, designer’s choices, mechanics, and history I think Andean Abyss succeeds as a simulation
of the Colombian Civil war. It uses several abstract mechanics, but it does not
feel abstract at all. I think is a giant step forward compared to what the
professional gaming community is using right now. Better designs, more defined
goals, more testing, My only caveat is
that the system can fall apart along the seams if conventional war-fighting elements are introduced. If you are interested in the recent history of
Colombia or in having a peak at how a real insurgency evolved and collapsed, Andean Abyss is indeed for you. The
fact that it is also a nail biting game with a real solitaire approach does not
hurt!
Also
despite my nasty approach to some categories I can assure you that no
academics, operational analysts, or British Army officers have been injured
during this review.